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OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus directing the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to r emand punitive
damages claims for trial together with the r emainder of
personal injury claims arising from asbestos exposure. We
will deny the petition for mandamus.
Petitioners are four individuals seeking damages for
injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. S 1407(a) the claims were transferred by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to Multidistrict
Litigation No. 875, which is pending in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
At the suggestion of the transferee judge, when the
Judicial Panel remanded the petitioners' claims to the
transferor courts, it withheld remand on the requests for
punitive damages. This action was consistent with the
transferee court's practice in multidistrict litigation
asbestos cases over the past decade of retaining demands
for punitive damages while allowing the compensatory
matters to proceed to trial. The practice has been noted by
this Court before. See In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140
n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The [transfer ee] court also has a
practice when it does remand cases of severing and
retaining jurisdiction over punitive damages claims."); Dunn
v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1400 n.13 (W eis, J., dissenting).
Petitioners contend that in "undertak[ing] the substantive
task of preserving the assets available to satisfy asbestos
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claims by refusing to remand the punitive damages issue,"
the Panel is overstepping its authority. They ar gue section
1407(a) only permits the Panel to separate"claims," but
requests for punitive damages do not have the
characteristics of independent claims because a party
cannot bring an action for such awards in isolation. On
that basis, petitioners assert that the law tr eats punitive
damages as a form of relief, not a claim or cause of action.
Respondents point out that claims for punitive damages,
although dependent on factors justifying compensatory
awards, require separate elements of proof such as malice,
fraud, or gross negligence. Moreover , respondents observe
that many courts require or permit evidence of a
defendant's wealth, a factor not generally per mitted when
only compensation is sought. Because such evidence is
necessary in order for a jury to assess punitive damages,
but irrelevant to the merits of other claims, many
jurisdictions also require that the punitive damages counts
be tried separately from proceedings that determine
compensatory awards.
Section 1407(a) provides that "civil actions involving one
or more common questions of fact . . . may be transferred
[by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation] to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pr etrial
proceedings." 28 U.S.C. S 1407(a). At or before conclusion
of the pretrial procedures, the Panel is to remand those
cases to the districts from which they wer e originally
transferred, "[p]rovided, however, That the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter -claim, or thirdparty claim and remand any of such claims befor e the
remainder of the action is remanded." Id.
Essentially, the petitioners would have us construe
"claim" in section 1407(a) to be synonymous with "cause of
action," and a request for punitive damages to be merely an
"issue" as that term is used in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b). We reject these contentions. As a term of
art and in common parlance, the meaning of "claim" is not
so circumscribed. For example, a cause of action based
upon negligence frequently is described as including
"claims" for property damage, lost wages, medical bills, and
pain and suffering. Neither the statute's language nor the
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snippets of legislative history cited to us pr ovides a basis
for adopting the petitioners' crabbed reading of the word.
Rather, the legislative history of section 1407 demonstrates
"that Congress intended transferee courts to have broad
pretrial authority." Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 144. In our
view, the Panel's expansive interpretation of"claim" is the
more reasonable one and that which we endorse.
Furthermore, although a demand for punitive damages
does not stand alone, it is not simply a component of a
claim inseparable from the whole. This distinctiveness is
demonstrated by case law allowing new trials devoted solely
to determining punitive damages. See, e.g. , Denesha v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., Inc., 161 F.3d 491, 505 (8th Cir. 1998);
Jannotta v. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., 125 F .3d 503,
517 (7th Cir. 1997). Separate trials of punitive damages
claims are also permitted. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
782 F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1986). A request for punitive
damages is similar to a derivative claim, such as for loss of
consortium, and may properly be characterized as "a
separate but dependent claim for relief " that must be
supported by independent allegations and proof. 1 James
D. Ghiardi, et al., Punitive Damages L. & Prac., S 12.07 at
22-23, 25 (1999).
In addition, the statute grants unusually br oad discretion
to the Panel to carry out its assigned functions. Subsection
(e) provides that "[n]o proceedings for review of any order of
the panel may be permitted except by extraor dinary writ
pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651, United
States Code." This vehicle that Congress chose for review is
one that we have held should only be granted "in response
to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of power."
Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 140. Petitioners have the burden to
establish that they "have no other adequate means to attain
the desired relief, and . . . that [their] right to the writ is
clear and indisputable . . . . Even when these r equirements
are met, issuance of the writ is largely discretionary." Id. at
141. In this way, Congress granted substantial authority to
the Panel to decide how the cases under its jurisdiction
should be coordinated. It is significant that section 1407(a)
directs that the Panel act "for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and . . . promote the just and efficient
conduct of such [civil] actions."
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An even more compelling reason to adopt the Panel's
interpretation is the public policy underlying the practice of
severing punitive damages claims. In Patenaude , we quoted
the transferee court's objectives in resolving the thousands
of cases assigned to it -- "that the sick and dying, their
widows and survivors should have their claims addr essed
first." Id. at 139. The Report of the Judicial Conference Ad
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation accurately appraised
the problem:
"Although there may be grounds to support an award,
multiple judgments for punitive damages in the mass
tort context against a finite number of defendants with
limited assets threaten fair compensation to pending
claimants and future claimants who await their
recovery, and threaten the economic viability of the
defendants. To the extent that some states do not [sic]
permit punitive damages, such awards can be viewed
as a malapportionment of a limited fund. Meritorious
claims may go uncompensated while earlier claimants
enjoy a windfall unrelated to their actual damages."
Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation at 32 (March 1991).
Punitive damages are a windfall to the r ecipients over
and above compensatory damages to which they ar e
entitled. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, punitive damages
are paid in part to the state rather than the individual
plaintiff. See Alaska Stat. S 9.17.020(j); Ga. Code Ann. S 5112-5.1(e)(2) (product liability cases); Utah Code Ann. S 7818-1(3).
The resources available to persons injur ed by asbestos
are steadily being depleted. The continuingfilings of
bankruptcy by asbestos defendants disclose that the
process is accelerating. It is responsible public policy to
give priority to compensatory claims over exemplary
punitive damage windfalls; this prudent conservation more
than vindicates the Panel's decision to withhold punitive
damage claims on remand. It is discouraging that while the
Panel and transferee court follow this enlightened practice,
some state courts allow punitive damages in asbestos
cases. The continued hemorrhaging of available funds
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deprives current and future victims of rightful
compensation.
Petitioners have failed to persuade us that the Panel
ruling was erroneous. The petition does not demonstrate
the extraordinary circumstances per mitting us to issue a
writ of mandamus, much less compel us to exer cise our
discretion and grant the request.
The petition for mandamus will be denied.
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